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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
the prejudgment seizure of chattels by the plaintiff in a replevin
action without an order of a judge or of a court... [is] unconsti-
tutional.102
Initially, it may seem that the court was interfering with the free-
dom to contract by finding the default clauses unconscionable. How-
ever, the court in Kosches was presented with a contract of adhesion
which permitted the taking of necessaries without notice and an op-
portunity to be heard. The recent cases in which contractual freedom
and the subsequent waiver of notice and a hearing have been upheld
can be distinguished in that they did not involve "specialized prop-
erty.' u9
3
CPLR 7102: Replevin held available to third party to contravene effect
of strike.
A strike is "[t]he act of quitting work by a body of workmen for
the purpose of coercing their employer to accede to some demand they
have made upon him, and which he has refused."' 94 Should a strike be
permitted to unnecessarily damage or destroy the business of an inno-
cent third party? Are there legal means by which such persons can
avoid the potentially devastating effects of strikes?
In General Electric Co. v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines,
Inc.,1 95 the plaintiff had learned that its shipment of radio speakers, to
which it had title, had arrived. The defendants - the shipper and the
freight agent-did not object to the plaintiff's coming and taking the
goods, which were being held at the docks; they simply noted the im-
practicality of doing so during a longshoremen's strike. The plaintiff
deemed this a refusal to turn over the speakers and applied for an ex
parte order of seizure under CPLR 7102. A hearing ensued during
which the defendants stated that they had no objection to the plaintiff's
taking the goods. The hearing was then adjourned so that the plaintiff
could obtain its property. However, when an attorney for the plaintiff,
with a truck and a driver, went to the pier, the truck was stopped by
about fifty strikers. When the hearing resumed the order of seizure was
denied on the ground that neither the shipper nor the freight agent
192 Id. at 725.
103 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. JR-P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Fuentes v.
Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 934 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
There are clear indications that the New York courts are taking a more consumer-
oriented approach in this area. For example, in Finkenberg Furniture Corp. v. Vasquez, 67
Misc. 2d 154, 324 N.Y.S.2d 840 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), the court declared that
"[t]he existence of such a waiver in a typical consumer contract of adhesion is without
... effect." Id. at 160, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
194 BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 1591 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
19 37 App. Div. 2d 959, 327 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.).
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nor the union "was . . . wrongfully holding [the speakers] within the
meaning of CPLR 7102."196 General Electric had requested a "John
Doe" order because it argued, "someone was wrongfully holding its
chattels. ... 197
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed. It de-
termined that the plaintiff was entitled to an order of seizure as an
appropriate remedy against "[t]his unlawful exercise of dominion and
control over plaintiff's property,"'198 which constituted a conversion. 199
An order directing the sheriff to seize the goods from "any and all
persons wrongfully holding or wrongfully preventing the taking into
possession" 200 of the plaintiff's goods was issued.
Judge Martuscello dissented. He reasoned that since the long-
shoremen were engaged in a legal strike, the issuance of the order of
seizure would have the same effect as a temporary injunction against
picketing so as to prevent the plaintiff from taking its goods. Suggest-
ing that the plaintiff should seek relief under section 807201 of the
Labor Law and not under article 71 of the CPLR, he argued that "one
should not be permitted to use the remedy of replevin to avoid the
rigorous requirements of section 807"202 for injunctions in labor dis-
putes.
The majority answered this objection with this reasoning:
Section 807 was enacted to prevent courts from issuing sweeping
injunctions which enjoin peaceful picketing and other lawful ac-
tivities in labor disputes. An order of seizure directing the sheriff
to seize these chattels cannot be construed as enjoining any labor
organization from any of the legitimate activities which section 807
is designed to protect.2 03
Too often, an innocent third party is injured when he cannot re-
trieve his goods because of a strike. If the plaintiff involved in the case
at bar were not General Electric but rather a small businessman, the
potentially devastating effect of a similar decision by the trial court
would be apparent. It is refreshing to see a court recognize this fact.
196 Id., 327 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., Industrial & Gen. Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 170 N.Y. 233, 245, 63 N.E. 285, 288
(1902); Boyce v. Brockway, 31 N.Y. 490 (1865); Suzuki v. Small, 214 App. Div. 541, 556,
212 N.Y.S. 589, 602 (Ist Dep't 1925), aff'd, 243 N.Y. 590, 154 N.E. 618 (1926).
200 37 App. Div. 2d 959, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
201 The statute protects against the issuance of unfair injunctions in labor disputes.
The many safeguards include the requirements of a hearing by the issuing court and the
finding of numerous facts. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 807 (McKinney 1965).
2023 7 App. Div. 2d at 960, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 96 (Martuscello, J., dissenting).
208 Id., 327 N.Y.S.2d at 95-96.
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It should not be inferred that the trial court's opinion would not
have been valid if management had sought the order of replevin. That
is the type of action which would circumvent the intention of the
Legislature in adopting section 807 of the Labor Law.20 4 No such cir-
cumvention is accomplished by allowing a non-party to the dispute to
obtain an order of seizure.
ARTICLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7501: Arbitration clauses construed.
Because of the very nature of the arbitral process, those contractual
stipulations which give rise to the arbitration cannot be overempha-
sized. In innumerable situations which have had profound effects upon
the development of "arbitration law," the paramount question has
been the meaning of the arbitration clause, with the result that the
breadth of the arbitration clause is proportionate to the scope of judi-
cial inquiry. Although New York has abandoned the "bona fide" dis-
pute rule,2 5 the anterior question remains: Is "the party seeking
arbitration making a claim which on its face is governed by the con-
tract[?]" '206
Two recent New York decisions have dealt with this threshold
question and, in the process, have underscored the significance of the
arbitration clause itself.
In Steinberg v. Steinberg,207 the plaintiffs submitted a demand
which, inter alia, stated that the defendants had wrongfully instituted
a prior arbitration proceeding, but the court correctly noted that
the tortious use of the arbitral process or other tort committed in
connection with the maintenance of the prior arbitration proceed-
204 The provisions of the statute indicate that it does not encompass action by a non-
party to the dispute. For example, subsection (4) states that
[n]o injunctive relief shall be granted to any plaintiff... who has failed to allege
and prove that he has made every reasonable effort to settle such dispute....
N.Y. Lnor LA%w § 807(4) (McKinney 1965). An individual who is not involved in the dis-
pute certainly would not be expected to take such action. Cf. Dinny & Robbins, Inc. v.
Davis, 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E2d 280, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 774, rehearing denied, 320 U.S.
811 (1943); Coward Shoe, Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salemen's Union Local 1115F, 177 Misc. 708,
31 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
205 The Cutler-Hammer doctrine provided that a judicial determination that the dis-
pute in question was viable was a prerequisite to compelling arbitration. Roundly criti-
cized, this doctrine has been vitiated by the last line of CPLR 7501: "[T]he court shall
not consider whether the claim with respect to which the arbitration is sought is tenable,
or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute."
200 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See
also Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n v. Conrad, 18 App. Div. 2d 321, 239 N.Y.S.2d 241
(4th Dep't 1963).
207 38 App. Div. 2d 57, 327 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Ist Dep't 1971).
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